Ransomware is malicious software that encrypts a company’s files and systems, after which attackers demand a ransom for the decryption key. Accounting, the warehouse and sales stop until the data is restored.
Below: how ransomware gets into a network, how to protect yourself in advance and what to do if an attack has already happened. We draw on the #StopRansomware guide from CISA, the FBI, the NSA and MS-ISAC and on guidance from the UK’s NCSC.
How an attack works
An attack is not only about encryption. CISA notes that attackers also steal data and pressure the victim by threatening to publish it. So even restoring from backups does not remove the threat of a leak.
Ransomware also deliberately looks for accessible backups and deletes or encrypts them, so that recovering without paying becomes impossible.
How ransomware gets into the network
CISA identifies six main routes:
| Route | What it means | More |
|---|---|---|
| Vulnerabilities and misconfigurations | Unpatched VPNs, servers and web applications, RDP exposed to the internet | Vulnerability management |
| Compromised credentials | Stolen or guessed passwords to VPN, email, remote access | Two-factor authentication |
| Phishing | An email with a malicious attachment or link | Phishing |
| Precursor malware | Other malware already in the network that “opens the door” for ransomware | Antivirus vs EDR |
| Advanced social engineering | A call from “tech support”, a request to install a remote access tool | Social engineering |
| Third parties and service providers | Access held by an IT contractor or supplier that is used to get into your network | — |
How to protect yourself in advance
Backups are the main defence. CISA recommends:
- keeping offline, encrypted copies of critical data;
- regularly checking that backups are available and intact — by restoring them, not just by reading a “backup successful” report;
- maintaining and updating “golden images” of critical systems so they can be rebuilt quickly.
How to organise this: “3-2-1 backup rule: protecting business data” and “Disaster recovery: RTO, RPO and a recovery plan”.
Close the entry routes:
- patch internet-facing systems, starting with those whose vulnerabilities are already exploited in attacks;
- do not expose RDP to the internet; remote access only via VPN;
- turn on phishing-resistant multi-factor authentication;
- separate administrator and regular accounts, and grant minimum privileges;
- train staff to recognise phishing and social engineering.
Limit the spread:
- segment the network so that one infected computer cannot reach every server;
- protect domain controllers — see “Active Directory security: the basic settings”;
- manage antivirus and endpoint protection centrally;
- keep logs — CISA recommends at least a year where possible — and watch them. Encryption is often the last step: before it, attackers get into the network, look for backups and steal data, so an attack can be spotted earlier — see “How a SOC works: tiers, processes and metrics”.
Prepare a response plan and rehearse it — see “Incident response: the plan and playbooks”.
What to do if your data is already encrypted
Following CISA’s checklist:
- Isolate affected systems. If many systems are affected, take the network offline at the switch level. Power devices down only as a last resort: traces of the attack remain in memory.
- Preserve evidence: system and memory images, logs.
- Communicate outside compromised channels — by phone, not corporate email, so as not to tip off the attackers.
- Report the incident — in Ukraine, to CERT-UA and the cyber police — and notify your insurer if you have a cyber insurance policy.
- Find out how the attackers got in, change passwords and fix vulnerabilities — otherwise the attack will happen again.
- Restore from clean backups in order of priority, without reinfecting restored systems.
First steps are described in detail on the “Security incident” page.
Should you pay the ransom
The NCSC and UK law enforcement do not encourage, endorse or condone paying ransom demands. The NCSC explains why:
- there is no guarantee you will get access to your data;
- your computers will still be infected;
- the money goes to criminal groups;
- a company that has paid is more likely to be targeted again.
On top of that, paying does not remove the threat that stolen data will be published.
Checklist
- There are offline copies of critical data, and restores are tested regularly
- Internet-facing systems are patched first
- RDP is not exposed to the internet; VPN and email are protected with a second factor
- Administrator accounts are separate from regular ones
- The network is segmented, and domain controllers are protected
- Endpoint protection is managed centrally
- Logs are retained and analysed
- There is a response plan with a ransomware playbook
- Staff know how to recognise phishing and where to report it
How Bereg-IT can help
- Before an attack: backup audit and a 3-2-1 strategy, endpoint protection, NGFW and vulnerability management.
- Detection: SOC as a Service collects and analyses security events and notifies you of suspicious activity with a severity assessment and recommended actions.
- During an incident: triage, isolating affected systems and accounts, investigation, restoring from clean backups and a report with recommendations — see “Security incident”.
The first consultation is free. Send a request and an information security specialist will get in touch.
Sources
- CISA, MS-ISAC, NSA, FBI, #StopRansomware Guide — prevention, initial access routes, response checklist: https://www.cisa.gov/stopransomware/ransomware-guide
- NCSC (UK), Ransomware — position on paying the ransom: https://www.ncsc.gov.uk/ransomware/home