Active Directory is Microsoft’s directory service that most Windows-based corporate networks rely on. It stores user and computer accounts, groups and access rights, and it runs sign-in and Group Policy (GPO). CISA calls Active Directory the most widely used authentication and authorization solution in enterprise networks — and notes that malicious actors routinely target it.
The reason is simple: whoever controls AD controls the whole network. Below: why the domain is the main target, which basic settings it needs and how to prepare for the worst case.
Why attackers go after Active Directory
According to Microsoft, if an attacker gains privileged access to a domain controller, they can modify, corrupt or destroy the AD database, and every system and account that AD manages is put at risk.
Attackers most often hunt for credentials:
- accounts with permanent administrator rights;
- accounts of executives and other important users;
- domain controllers and servers that manage access, certificates or configuration.
Common administrator habits also create risk, and Microsoft names them directly: signing in with a privileged account on unsecured computers, browsing the internet with such an account, the same local administrator password on every machine, too many people in administrator groups.
Joint guidance by Australia’s ASD, CISA, NSA and partners describes the 17 most common techniques used against Active Directory and how to mitigate each.
Basic security settings
- As few administrators as possible. By default, three built-in groups have the highest privileges in AD: Enterprise Admins, Domain Admins and Administrators. Microsoft recommends eliminating permanent membership in them and granting the rights temporarily when they are really needed.
- Separate accounts for administration. Everyday work under a normal account, administration under a separate one with only the rights it needs.
- Secure administrative workstations. Computers used to administer the domain have no email, browser or office software. Microsoft’s rule: never administer a trusted system from a less-trusted host. Privileged accounts get multi-factor authentication.
- Unique local administrator passwords. Windows LAPS automatically rotates and backs up the local administrator password on each device. This protects against attacks where one stolen password opens every machine. The feature is free and built into supported versions of Windows and Windows Server.
- Protected domain controllers. Physical security, security baselines enforced through Group Policy, only the software that is needed, timely updates.
- Updates and legacy systems. Microsoft recommends isolating and eventually decommissioning legacy systems and applications — see “Windows Server 2016 end of support: what to do”.
- Antivirus on every system, with monitoring of attempts to disable it.
- Account hygiene. Inactive users, old computers, service accounts with excessive rights — all of these should be reviewed and cleaned up regularly.
How to spot an attack
Microsoft recommends configuring advanced auditing and monitoring sensitive AD objects for changes and Windows for events that might indicate attempted compromise. In practice, watch for:
- new members of administrator groups;
- mass failed sign-ins across different accounts;
- administrators signing in from unusual computers or at unusual times;
- new group policies that run scripts on every machine;
- attempts to disable antivirus or logging.
These events should go to a monitoring system where someone works through them — more in “SIEM vs SOC: the difference for business”.
Plan recovery in advance
No defence is perfect, so Microsoft recommends having an incident recovery plan. For AD this means:
- regular backups of domain controllers, protected against deletion and encryption — see “3-2-1 backup rule: protecting business data”;
- tested AD recovery, not just the existence of backups;
- an action plan: who isolates affected systems and how privileged and service account passwords are changed.
If an attack is happening right now, see the first steps on the “Security incident” page.
Checklist
- Enterprise Admins, Domain Admins and Administrators contain only those who really need it
- Administrators work under separate accounts with multi-factor authentication
- The domain is administered only from secure workstations
- Local administrator passwords are unique and managed with Windows LAPS
- Domain controllers are physically protected, updated and free of extra software
- Legacy systems are isolated or decommissioned
- Inactive and unneeded accounts are cleaned up regularly
- Auditing is configured, and AD events go to monitoring
- There are AD backups and a tested recovery plan
How Bereg-IT can help
We set up and support IT infrastructure: Active Directory, Group Policy, Microsoft System Center, backup with AD recovery, and monitoring. During an internal network penetration test we check Active Directory and segmentation, and SOC as a Service monitors events from servers and endpoints to spot an attack in time.
The first consultation is free. Send a request and an IT engineer will get in touch.
Sources
- CISA, “ASD’s ACSC, CISA, and US and International Partners Release Guidance on Detecting and Mitigating Active Directory Compromises” (26.09.2024): https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/alerts/2024/09/25/asds-acsc-cisa-and-us-and-international-partners-release-guidance-detecting-and-mitigating-active
- ASD’s ACSC, CISA, NSA and partners, Detecting and Mitigating Active Directory Compromises (revised 15.09.2026): https://www.cisa.gov/resources-tools/resources/detecting-and-mitigating-active-directory-compromises
- Microsoft Learn, Best practices for securing Active Directory: https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-server/identity/ad-ds/plan/security-best-practices/best-practices-for-securing-active-directory
- Microsoft Learn, Windows LAPS overview: https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-server/identity/laps/laps-overview