A stolen, guessed or phished password is the easiest way into someone else’s account. According to the review by Ukraine’s National Cybersecurity Coordination Center, compromised RDP and VPN accounts were among the main initial access vectors in 2025, and taking over messenger accounts remained a priority for attackers. A second check at sign-in makes the password alone not enough for an attack.
Below: what two-factor authentication (2FA) is, which options are reliable and which are not, and how to roll it out in a company.
What two-factor authentication is
NIST defines multifactor authentication as authentication using two or more different factors:
- something you know — a password, a PIN;
- something you have — a token, a security key, a phone with an app;
- something you are — biometrics.
Two-factor authentication is MFA with two factors. The factors must be different: two passwords, or a password and a “secret question”, are still one factor.
Options: from strongest to weakest
CISA ranks MFA methods by how well they resist attacks:
| Method | Examples | Weak points |
|---|---|---|
| Phishing-resistant MFA | Security keys and passkeys on FIDO/WebAuthn, smart cards and certificates (PKI) | CISA calls it the “gold standard” |
| App or token code, push notification with number matching | A one-time code in an app, a hardware token | The code can be phished on a fake site |
| Push notification without number matching | “Approve sign-in?” — “Yes” | Vulnerable to “push bombing” and accidental approval |
| SMS or voice call | A code in a text message | Phishing, attacks on carrier networks (SS7), SIM swap |
For small and medium-sized businesses that cannot yet roll out phishing-resistant MFA, CISA recommends an app or token with a one-time code, or push notifications with number matching. SMS should be a last resort only. NIST’s authentication guidelines also give the use of the phone network for such checks a restricted status.
Why “phishing-resistant” matters
Any code a person types in by hand can be phished: a fake site will ask for it just as it asks for the password. NIST states directly that methods involving manual entry of a code are not considered phishing-resistant. FIDO/WebAuthn keys work differently: they are bound to the real site’s address and simply do not work on a fake one. That is why CISA urges moving administrators and other high-value targets to them first.
Where to turn it on first
CISA recommends starting with what attackers target most often: email, file servers, remote access and identity systems. In practice that means:
- email and cloud services — Microsoft 365 among them;
- remote access — VPN and RDP;
- administrator accounts — see “Active Directory security: the basic settings”.
For Ukrainian businesses, add the client-bank and accounting systems, as well as messengers: turn on the two-step verification password in them.
NBU requirements
For insurers, credit unions, finance companies and pawnshops, NBU Resolution No. 143 requires multifactor authentication for users and privileged users when they access systems remotely (paragraph 20); biometrics may be used only as one of the factors. Privileged accounts need stronger password requirements or multifactor authentication, as well as separate accounts for administration and everyday work (paragraph 22). More in “NBU Resolution 143: cybersecurity rules for NBFIs”.
How to roll it out in a company
- Inventory of sign-ins: email, VPN, RDP, cloud services, admin panels, accounting, the website.
- Choosing methods: security keys for administrators, an app with number matching for everyone else, SMS only temporarily.
- A pilot with the IT team and managers.
- Account recovery. What to do if an employee loses their phone — with mandatory identity verification. Otherwise “I lost my phone, reset my MFA” becomes a favourite social engineering trick — see “Social engineering: what it is and how to defend”.
- Close the workarounds: old protocols and accounts that still sign in with just a password.
- Training: do not approve a sign-in you did not start, and report such prompts.
- Monitoring: series of rejected approvals, sign-ins from new countries and devices.
Signs of an attack on MFA
- a series of approval prompts for sign-ins you did not make;
- a call from “support” or “the bank” asking for a code;
- your phone suddenly loses service — a possible SIM swap.
In all these cases: approve nothing, change the password and tell the person responsible for security. First steps are on the “Security incident” page.
Checklist
- There is a list of every system that can be accessed from outside
- Email, cloud, VPN and RDP are protected with two-factor authentication
- Administrators use phishing-resistant security keys
- SMS is used only where there is no other option yet
- Push approvals use number matching
- There is a secure account recovery procedure with identity verification
- Old protocols without MFA are turned off
- Employees know what to do with an unexpected approval prompt
How Bereg-IT can help
At a consultation or audit we find where you still sign in with just a password. We set up multi-factor authentication for email, cloud services, VPN and remote access, as well as Active Directory group policies (IT infrastructure, information security). SOC as a Service monitors suspicious sign-ins and series of rejected approvals.
The first consultation is free. Send a request and an information security specialist will get in touch.
Sources
- NIST CSRC Glossary, multifactor authentication (definition from CNSSI 4009-2022): https://csrc.nist.gov/glossary/term/multi_factor_authentication
- CISA, Implementing Phishing-Resistant MFA (October 2022): https://www.cisa.gov/sites/default/files/publications/fact-sheet-implementing-phishing-resistant-mfa-508c.pdf
- NIST SP 800-63B-4, Digital Identity Guidelines: Authentication and Authenticator Management (2025): https://pages.nist.gov/800-63-4/sp800-63b.html
- National Cybersecurity Coordination Center at the NSDC of Ukraine, Review of the National Cybersecurity System of Ukraine 2025 (in Ukrainian): https://www.rnbo.gov.ua/files/2026/NATIONAL_CYBER_SCC/kiber_2025.pdf
- Resolution of the Board of the National Bank of Ukraine of 09.12.2025 No. 143, paragraphs 20, 22 of the Regulation (in Ukrainian): https://bank.gov.ua/admin_uploads/law/09122025_143.pdf