Since late September 2026, Russian strikes have put several Kyiv data centres out of action. Some operators said their sites cannot be restored and carried on from standby sites — including in the EU.
Below: what is known as of 29 October 2026, and what a company should check if its servers, cloud or backups sit in a single data centre.
What is known as of 29 October 2026
According to Ukrainian media reports and the companies’ own statements:
| Reported | Data centre | What is known |
|---|---|---|
| 27 September | Cosmonova | after an attack on 26 September the data centre stopped and will no longer operate; specialists were partly moving and restoring services |
| 1 October | Parkovyi | after a series of strikes in September the site fully stopped and its services cannot be restored there; client data was deployed to standby sites in the EU |
| 1 October | dline.ua | the data centre at 28 Predslavynska Street was destroyed; all services and client data were moved to standby sites |
| 6 October | Omega Telecom | after a massive attack the Kyiv data centre is ceasing operations; communication channels and internet access are being restored at standby sites |
| 19 October | Datagroup | after a night-time ballistic attack the data centre’s equipment and infrastructure were completely knocked out and it cannot be restored; no staff were hurt, and services continue from standby sites |
The table shows the dates of the reports. The strikes themselves may have come earlier, and dates differ between sources. For example, strikes on Datagroup facilities were also reported in September.
The list is not complete. By the count of the outlet Slovo i Dilo, about ten Kyiv data centres were damaged or destroyed in September alone; the outlet cautions that its list may be incomplete. Forbes Ukraine reported at least six data centres damaged between 23 and 28 September.
National Bank of Ukraine Governor Andriy Pyshnyi told Interfax-Ukraine that the banking system was barely affected by the strikes. At the same time, he said, banks’ business continuity testing protocols do not always contain sufficiently detailed procedures, and the attacks provided information to improve them.
What follows from this
- One data centre is one point of failure. Redundancy inside a building — dual power supplies, RAID, a virtualisation cluster, a generator — protects against hardware failure and power cuts, but not against losing the building itself.
- A second site is what saves you. Operators that had standby sites kept providing services: dline.ua, Parkovyi and Datagroup said so.
- The provider’s standby site is not necessarily yours. A provider can move its own services. Whether your virtual machines, data and backups move with them depends on the service you bought and on the contract.
So the main question for your provider is not “how reliable is your data centre” but “what happens to my systems if it is gone”.
What to check now
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Where your systems physically run. Your own servers in colocation, rented servers, cloud, website hosting, backups, your domain’s DNS — in which data centres and cities. It often turns out that the main system and its copies sit in the same place.
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Copies away from the main site. Under the 3-2-1 rule, at least one copy should be on another site — preferably in another city or country — and one should be protected against changes and deletion. More in “3-2-1 backup rule: protecting business data”.
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RTO and RPO. How long each system can be down and how much data you can afford to lose. This decides whether copies are enough or whether you need a standby site with ready-to-run machines. How to set them — see “Disaster recovery: RTO, RPO and a recovery plan”.
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A standby site. Where to bring up critical systems: another data centre in another region of Ukraine, a data centre in the EU, or a public cloud with European regions. How to combine sites — see “Hybrid cloud: what it is and when you need it”.
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A tested restore. Restore a system at the standby site before you need to: does it work, how long does it take, who does what.
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The provider contract. Find out:
- where your data and copies are physically stored;
- whether the provider has standby capacity, where it is, and whether it is part of your service;
- how quickly and on what terms the service is moved to a standby site;
- how and in what format you will get your data back if the site is lost or the contract ends;
- who is responsible for backups — the provider or you;
- how the provider reports incidents.
For financial institutions, the contract content is set by the NBU — see “Cloud provider contract under NBU Resolution 99”.
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Connectivity and access. A second internet link, and access to the standby site that doesn’t depend on the main one. Keep your domain’s DNS outside the data centre that hosts your website and email: otherwise, losing the site also takes away the ability to redirect traffic.
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The plan and the people. Who decides to switch over, who carries it out, and how to get in touch if corporate email is down.
A standby site in Ukraine or in the EU
Both options make sense. A site in another region of Ukraine is closer to users and simpler legally. A site in the EU is outside the combat zone. Some companies combine the two: main infrastructure in Ukraine and the standby site in the EU, or the other way round.
Regulated companies should first check the requirements on personal data, their sector regulator, and the list of cloud service providers for the public sector and critical infrastructure operators. More in “Ukrainian or European cloud: which to choose” and “Moving servers to the EU: when it makes sense”.
Checklist
- You know which data centres host your systems, copies, website and DNS
- At least one copy is kept on another site, and one more is protected against changes and deletion
- RTO and RPO are set for each critical system
- There is a standby site for systems that can’t wait for a restore from copies
- A restore at the standby site has been tested in practice
- The provider contract covers standby capacity, data return and incident reporting
- There is a second internet link, and DNS doesn’t depend on the main site
- There is a switchover plan with named owners and a backup way to communicate
How Bereg-IT can help
We have moved our own infrastructure from Ukraine to the EU and helped our clients do the same. We’ll assess where your systems run and where your copies are kept, set RTO and RPO together with you, set up backups away from the main site and test the restore. If you need a standby site or a full move, we deploy infrastructure in EU data centres on VMware, Microsoft Azure or AWS; we work with European providers. More on the IT infrastructure migration to the EU page; you can start with a consultation or an audit.
The first consultation is free. Send a request and we’ll assess whether your systems would survive losing a data centre.
Sources
- NikVesti, Cosmonova data centre fully stopped operating after Russian shelling (in Ukrainian, 27.09.2026): https://nikvesti.com/news/defence/324271-rosiiskyi-obstril-povnistiu-zupynyv-robotu-data-tsentr-cosmonova
- LB.ua, Parkovyi data centre fully stopped operating after enemy attacks (in Ukrainian, 01.10.2026): https://lb.ua/society/2026/10/01/770394_datatsentr_parkoviy_povnistyu.html
- Forbes Ukraine, on the Parkovyi shutdown and damaged data centres (in Ukrainian, 01.10.2026): https://forbes.ua/news/data-centr-parkovii-u-kijevi-povnistiu-zupiniv-robotu-pislia-rosiiskix-udariv-01102026-42570
- Hromadske Radio, Russians destroyed the dline.ua data centre in Kyiv (in Ukrainian, 01.10.2026): https://hromadske.radio/news/2026/10/01/rosiiany-zruynuvaly-data-tsentr-dline-ua-u-kyievi
- Slovo i Dilo, infographic on attacks on Kyiv data centres (in Ukrainian, 02.10.2026): https://www.slovoidilo.ua/2026/10/02/infografika/bezpeka/xmarni-misheni-vidomo-pro-ataky-rosiyi-stolychni-data-centry
- 5 Kanal, Kyiv data centre Omega Telecom stopped operating after a Russian attack (in Ukrainian, 06.10.2026): https://www.5.ua/ukrayina/kyivskyi-data-tsentr-omeha-telekom-prypynyv-robotu-cherez-naslidky-ataky-rf-384316.html
- Novynarnia, Russian ballistic attack completely knocked out Datagroup’s data centre: restoration impossible (in Ukrainian, 19.10.2026): https://novynarnia.com/2026/10/19/1-rosiiska-balistychna-ataka-povnistiu-vyvela-z-ladu-datatsentr/
- UA.NEWS, Russian strikes on data centres revealed problems in Ukrainian banks’ preparedness — NBU Governor’s interview with Interfax-Ukraine (in Ukrainian, 26.10.2026): https://ua.news/ua/war-vs-rf/rosiiski-udari-po-datatsentrakh-viiavili-problemi-v-pidgotovtsi-ukrayinskikh-bankiv